



















In a series of joint papers (Felin and Foss 2005, 2006; Abell et al. 2007; Felin and Hesterly 2007),​[1]​ Teppo Felin and Nicolai J. Foss recently launched a microfoundations project in the field of strategic management. Felin and Foss argue that extant explanations in strategic management are predominantly collectivist. In these explanations, routines and organizational capabilities, which are taken to be properties of firms (and hence are situated at the collective, or ‘macro’, rather than at the individual or ‘micro’ level), figure prominently. In the extant literature in strategic management, routines and organizational capabilities sometimes are explananda in explanations (e.g., when they are seen as outcomes of organizational learning). At other times they are explanantia in explanations (e.g., when firm behavior and firm performance are seen as outcomes of routines or capabilities that are in operation). In both cases the explanations remain at the collective level: phenomena or events at the collective level are explained in terms of other phenomena or events at the collective level. The explanations do not refer to what is going on at the underlying individual (or ‘micro’) level. This is a significant deficiency of the explanations, Felin and Foss argue, for it is clear that individual agents and their actions and interactions play a crucial, indispensable role not only in how routines and organizational capabilities originate in the first place, in how they are subsequently maintained, revised or replaced, but also in how routines and organizational capabilities affect firm behavior and firm performance. Felin and Foss’s microfoundations project is meant to repair this deficiency: more attention should be paid to exactly how individual agents and their actions and interactions are involved in the emergence and functioning of routines.























The diagram is meant to be helpful in identifying what is wrong with extant macro-level empirical generalizations in social science that are presented as bona fide explanations of macro-phenomena. In particular, Coleman deploys the diagram to show that crucial steps are missing in macro-level empirical generalizations.

Coleman argues that there are serious deficiencies in explanations that remain at the level of the system, such as Max Weber’s explanation (in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1904): the (protestant) religious values of a society contributed to the rise of the (capitalist) economic organization of a society (this is what Coleman calls a macro-level empirical generalization). In particular Weber’s explanation leaves unclear how precisely the religious values of a society affect the individuals (the macro-to-micro problem) and how the actions and interactions in turn contributed to the rise of capitalism (the micro-to-macro problem). In effect Coleman argues that explanations of macro-level empirical generalizations like this one should descend (one level). They should be explicit in particular about how they solve the macro-to-micro and the micro-to-macro problem.

Anticipating the discussion of Felin and Foss’s interpretation and use of Coleman’s diagram it is instructive to point out also what Coleman does not argue. First, Coleman is not claiming that his diagram accurately depicts all possible relations between the macro and micro-level. Indeed, as Coleman himself notes, his macro-to-micro-to-macro diagram is not sacrosanct and should not be reified. The more general situation, Coleman argues, is a system of action in which the three types of relations are not easily separable. What Coleman is ultimately pleading for is that macro-level generalizations are predicted as deductions from a theory of individual action together with a theory of how these actions combine (Coleman 1990, 20).

Second, Coleman is not demanding that it is always necessary or useful to descend all the way to individuals and their actions and interactions. For some purposes firms (or, more generally, formal organizations) can be treated as unitary agents, for example. How far to descend should be based on pragmatic considerations. One such pragmatic consideration is that the level of analysis chosen should be useful for the sort of interventions for which the explanation is intended.

Most importantly for our present purposes, there is no evidence that Coleman thinks of the macro-to-micro transition in terms of downward causation. Coleman does not think of religious values of a society as some sort of sui generis causal force exerting causal influence on individuals. Coleman does not believe that macro-structures have an independent existence of their own. As Coleman remarks “… there is no tangible macro level… the macro level, the system behavior, is an abstraction” (ibid, 12). Indeed, there is evidence that Coleman believes that there is no such thing as downward causation. True, Coleman does believe that particular values are instilled in people that are consequently reflected in their preferences and goals. But this is not a matter of downward causation. Instead, these are processes in which Protestant religious values are transmitted from the one set of individuals (parents, teachers, preachers, tutors, role models, …) to another set of individuals. What happens can be described completely at the level of individuals, their actions and interactions and the conditions (or environment, or context) under which they operate. Individuals transform the structure of positions under influence of their changing goals, creating a new context for themselves and thereby contributing to the transition in the organization of society from a feudal to a capitalist society (ibid, 11-12). This can be conceived of in terms of players in a game with roles and rules who gradually change the roles and rules in the games they playing.


3. Coleman’s diagram in the hands of Abell, Felin and Foss

Abell et al. (2007) observe that the explanations invoking routines and organizational capabilities given in organization science and in strategic management are predominantly collectivist or macro-explanations. Whether routines and organizational capabilities are the explananda or explanantia in explanations, most extant explanations in organization science and in strategic management stay at the collective or macro-level. Such explanations do not address what happens underneath, at the individual or micro-level.

Although Nelson and Winter (1982) were not the first to write about routines and organizational capabilities, much in the current literature on routines and organizational capabilities can be traced back to Nelson and Winter’s seminal work. Nelson and Winter argue that understanding a firm’s routines provides the key to understanding the firm’s behavior. Following Nelson and Winter’s discussion of routines (which they define as “… a capability for a smooth sequence of coordinated behavior that is ordinarily effective relative to its objectives, given the context in which it normally occurs”, Nelson and Winter 1982, 73), Abell et al. describe routines as organization-specific repetitive interactions within the entire organization that are typically patterned in fixed sequences of individual action (Abell et al. 2007, 10). Thus routines are macro- rather than micro-phenomena: they are properties or features of firms rather than of individuals. They are the specific ways in which the actions and interactions of several organization members are patterned (or organized, or coordinated) within the entire organization.

Routines are explananda in attempts to explain the origin or emergence of routines. Abell et al. argue that typically no sustained attempt is made to analyze rigorously how and why the actions taken by different individuals in an organizational setting come to mesh into orderly and repetitive patterns. That is, no individualist or micro explanation of the emergence of routines is forthcoming. Yet it is perfectly clear that routines originate from the actions taken by different individuals. Instead, most explanations are collectivist or macro in that they treat new (first-order) routines as the outcomes of organizational (as opposed to individual) learning guided by (second-order) search routines.

Routines are (part of the) explanantia in attempts to explain the behavior and performance of firms. Differences in behavior and performance among firms are explained by referring to the differences between the routines that the firms have. It is assumed in such macro-explanations that routines are a direct cause of firm behavior and of firm performance.

The main problem Abell et al. have with such macro-explanations is that they are incomplete. What they mean by this can be understood in general terms; no specific knowledge of firms, their organization, routines, behavior and performance is needed to understand the point they are trying to make.

Macro (or collectivist) explanations are understood by Abell et al. as explanations that refer only to macro (or collectivist) entities and properties. Both the explanandum and the explanans of macro explanations are located at the macro level. And also the mechanisms linking the explanans and the explanandum in macro explanation are taken to be macro (or collectivist) mechanisms. Examples are explanations of the emergence of routines in terms of organizational learning and explanations of firm behavior and firm performance in terms of (already existing) routines.

Arguing that the main problem with macro explanations is that they are incomplete, as Abell et al. (2007) do, suggests that macro explanations are lacking in some respect. Macro explanations allegedly miss out on something. Or they allegedly leave out something. Abell et al. make clear that what is lacking in macro explanations is an account (i.e., a description, or a clarification) of micro mechanisms. Macro explanations fail to highlight that the causal process leading from the one set of macro (or collective) entities and properties such as routines, capabilities to the other set (such as firm-level consequences) is mediated by (possibly complex) patterns of individual action and interaction. Abell et al. argue that sets of macro entities and properties are always and necessarily causally linked to each other via individual action and interaction. Yet macro explanations neglect this. Macro explanations seem to assume erroneously that there are causal mechanisms that work solely on the macro level and that such macro mechanisms link macro phenomena directly to each other. They fail to appreciate that no such macro mechanisms exist: there are no causal mechanisms working solely at the macro level and causal mechanisms linking macro phenomena always run through individual action and interaction. 

Abell et al. use Coleman’s diagram to illustrate in a more precise and detailed way what is lacking in macro explanations.


Abell et al.’s discussion of Coleman’s diagram suggests that Arrows 1, 2 and 3 all are taken to stand for causal relations. Felin and Foss clearly state that Arrow 1 involves macro-micro causality (Felin and Foss 2006, 266). One such macro-to-micro mechanism, they argue, is provided by socialization: when individuals grow up in a particular culture or society, they tend to adopt the culture’s or society’s prevailing social norms. Note that this is surely meant to be a causal process in which a macro phenomenon (a particular culture or society) causally affects the properties of individuals. As Abell et al.’s plea for a micro-explanation of the emergence of routines indicates, Arrow 3 is to be understood also as a causal relation (as part of a more encompassing causal chain). Explicating or specifying Arrow 3 here (in the left part of the above Figure) means spelling out how the actions and interactions result in the emergence of a new routines.

The underlying idea here seems to be that the total causal chain linking macro phenomena can be decomposed into separate (temporally non-overlapping), discrete parts or links. In principle, each of the causal parts could be either wholly at the macro level (“intra-level”, as indicated by Arrow 4), wholly at the micro level (“intra-level” again, as indicated by Arrow 2), or linking the macro with the micro level (“inter-level”, as indicated by Arrows 2 and 3). But in fact, Abell et al. argue, the causal parts in the total causal chain linking macro phenomena are indicated by Arrows 1, 2 and 3 respectively, and not by Arrow 4 (as macro explanations wrongly assume).

If the foregoing interpretation is on the right track, it implies that what is wrong with macro explanation is not so much that it is incomplete but that it is altogether mistaken. The problem with macro explanation is not that it omits certain parts of the total causal chain linking macro phenomena, but that it gets the total causal chain completely wrong. The total causal chain linking macro phenomena always consists of the route indicated by arrows 1, 2 and 3 in Coleman’s diagram and macro explanations do not get any part of this chain right.

Hedström and Swedberg, whom Abell et al. approvingly refer to, are particularly adamant on this:

A corollary to this principle states that there exist no such things as “macro-level mechanisms”; macro-level entities or events are always linked to one another via combinations of situational mechanisms [macro-micro arrow 1], action-formation mechanisms [micro-micro arrow 2], and transformational mechanisms [micro-macro arrow 3] (i.e., all macro-level change should be conceptualized in terms of three separate transitions: macro-micro, micro-micro, and micro-macro).
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 24)

At best the macro mechanisms referred to in macro explanations (indicated by arrow 4) are useful or convenient shorthands that completely bypass the actual causal chain:

Thus, the above demonstrates that we can use collective level, arrow 4 explanations at best as shorthand or “reduced form” explanation. Arrow 4 must always be either a conjunction of mechanisms indicated by arrows 1, 2 and 3 or/and arrows 1a and 3. Thus, in explaining collective level phenomena, reference must be made to the level of the individual. A further interpretation is that individual-level/micro explanation replaces collective level/macro explanation.
(Abel et al. 2007, 20 – Italics in the original)






As the Bibliography: Recent Work on Mechanisms in Philosophy of Science (http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/LDarden/Research/bibmech.htm) immediately makes clear, Glennan (1986) and Machamer et al. (2000) are part of a larger movement in philosophy of science. Much of the work done by William Bechtel, James Bogen and William Wimsatt also belongs to this movement, for example. A starting-point for this movement is the observation that causal explanation in science (the sort of explanation Abell et al. seem to be after) often is mechanistic explanation. To explain a phenomenon mechanistically is to show how it is produced by a mechanism. Several definitions of ‘mechanism’ are put forward, but what they all have in common with each other is that mechanisms consist of parts (entities) that are organized in such a way that their activities and interactions “… are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or terminal conditions” (Machamer et al. 2000, 3). Giving a mechanistic explanation implies that what happens in between a system’s start or set-up conditions and its finish or terminal conditions is not treated as a black box, but is highlighted. The way in which the mechanism’s parts behave, interact and are organized are peered into. As Craver puts it, “mechanistic explanation is inherently componential” (Craver 2007, 131). In this sense, mechanistic explanations have an inbuilt reductionist bias. In mechanistic explanation one is looking not just at what the system is doing, but also “into the system” at how it is doing what it is doing.

Thus, giving a mechanistic explanation implies that a system is decomposed into its constituent parts (see also Simon 1969 and Cummins 1975 and 2000 for similar views). Often the parts of a mechanism can themselves be seen as mechanisms with parts. Thus systems are often nested and mechanisms are often multilevel. If a mechanism is multilevel it can be analyzed at different levels. The relation between the levels is that of a whole and its constitutive parts. Indeed, in mechanistic explanation “…levels of mechanisms are defined componentially within a hierarchically organized mechanism” (Craver 2007, 191). Craver makes clear that the way levels are identified in mechanistic explanation is not to be confused with other ways that have been suggested in the literature. In mechanistic explanation, levels are not identified by the different subject matters of scientific disciplines, for example, and neither are they understood in mereological terms. Craver argues in particular that the relation between the entities identified at adjacent levels in mechanistic explanation is not a causal one (Craver 2007, 183, 188/189, 195).

In short, the (“vertical”) relation between levels in mechanistic explanation is constitutive or componential, rather than causal. In mechanistic explanation, levels relate to each other as wholes to their component parts, not as causes and their effects. Craver identifies three respects in which constitutive relations differ from causal ones. First, whereas causal relations are diachronic, constitutive relations are synchronic. Causal processes take time, while constitutive relations are instantaneous. Second, whereas causal relations are asymmetric, constitutive relations are symmetrical.​[2]​ It is not just that causes precede effects, changes in causes bring about changes in effects while the converse does not occur. By contrast, changes in parts entail (constitutively, not causally) changes in wholes and also conversely changes in wholes entail changes in parts. Thirdly and finally, it is widely assumed that causes and effects are logically independent (or must at least be wholly distinct; cf. Lewis 2000), whereas wholes and their parts are logically dependent (they are clearly not wholly distinct).

Within the broader category of mechanistic explanation, Craver accordingly distinguishes between etiological and constitutive (or better: componential) explanation. Etiological mechanistic explanation aims to explain how some finish or terminal condition of a system is brought about by the working of a mechanism which is activated (or triggered) by some start or set-up conditions. Constitutive mechanistic explanation aims to show how the mechanism works internally. More precisely, in constitutive mechanistic explanation the working of a mechanism as a whole (mediating or transmitting between inputs and ouputs) – S’s ψ-ing (or: acting entities) – is explained by the specific way in which the actions of the system’s components  - X’s φ-ing – are organized.

Craver and Bechtel (2007) argue that whereas constitutive relations are always “vertical” and inter-level, causal relations are always “horizontal”, that is intra-level. By insisting that causal relations always are exclusively intra-level, well-known metaphysical problems that inter-level causation is fraught with can be circumvented. Interestingly, Craver and Bechter argue that the mysterious if not incoherent metaphysics of inter-level causation (Craver and Bechter 2007, 562) results from ignoring the three respects in which constitutive relations differ from causal relations discussed above. Especially Jaegwon Kim (2000) points out the incoherent metaphysical picture that emerges if it is not appreciated that unlike causes (that precede their effects), components do not precede the wholes they are part of.

Craver and Bechtel set out to show that all supposedly clear cases of inter-level causation can be analyzed coherently as mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effect are hybrids of causal (which are exclusively intra-level) and constitutive (which are exclusively inter-level) claims. Not only can alleged cases of “downward causation” (or top-down causation) be decomposed into a vertical constitutive and a horizontal causal one, so can alleged cases of “upward causation” (or bottom-up causation). As a general strategy for rendering alleged cases of upward causation coherent, Craver and Bechtel recommend the following: “In the bottom-up cases, we show that ordinary causal interactions between components of a mechanism produce a condition in the mechanism that constitutes a state of the mechanism identified at the higher level. There are no causal interactions beyond those at a level” (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 561).





















Several things follow from this.

First the squared diagram helps us understand better why, contrary to what Felin and Foss argue, the fact that individuals, their properties and their actions and interactions are always involved in any causal chain linking macro phenomena does not imply that there is inter-level causation. Felin and Foss are right that individuals, their properties and their actions and interactions are always involved in any causal chain linking macro phenomena. But contrary to what Felin and Foss suggest, individuals, their properties and their actions and interactions are not relata in inter-level causal relations. They rather are constitutive component parts in macro phenomena.

The squared diagram helps us see where Felin and Foss go wrong. Their Arrow 1 is a hybrid of a constitutive relation (Arrow 5) and a causal relation (Arrow 6). Similarly, Arrow 3 is a hybrid of a causal relation (Arrow 7) and constitutive relation (Arrow 8). In other words, not Arrow 4, but instead Arrows 1 and 3 appear as convenient or useful shorthands. Both Arrow 1 and 3 short-circuit a more complex combination of a constitutive and a causal relation.

By contrast, Arrow 4 stands for a pure causal relation. The fact that the causal relation is located at the macro-level does not imply that chunks (or parts) of the causal chain relating macro-phenomena have to be missed out on. We can make macro-explanations (that refer to macro-mechanisms) as fine-grained as we want. What we could do, for example, is split up Arrow 4 into “smaller-grained” Arrows 4a, 4b and 4c that correspond diachronically with Arrows 6, 2 and 7 at the micro-level. In short, an Arrow 4 mechanism can be complete in the sense that it gets the full causal etiology right.

Even if all this is on the right track, it might still be objected that the macro-mechanism indicated by Arrow 4, or by Arrows 4a, 4b and 4c, exists by virtue of the underlying micro-level mechanisms 6, 2 and 7. It might still be argued that this provides a good reason to focus on micro-level mechanisms 6, 2 and 7, rather than on the macro-level mechanisms: the causal powers of the micro-level mechanisms are more basic than those of the macro-level mechanisms (which are taken to be derived from the former). Craver and Bechtel’s account implies, however, that it is more accurate to speak of one mechanism that has several levels than of different mechanisms, each of which works at a different level. If we have a multi-level mechanism, the issue of what mechanism is more basic (or has more basic causal powers) does not arise.

The only reason to prefer a micro-explanation (an explanation in terms of the mechanism, or mechanisms, described at the micro-level) to a macro-explanation (an explanation in terms of the mechanism, or mechanisms, described at the macro-level) is that the former is more informative how the phenomena to be explained is brought about. The latter only refers to the mechanism(s) without specifying how it works. In this sense a macro-explanation would be more facile or superficial than a micro-explanation. Indeed, the macro-explanation would not be a mechanistic explanation at all for a macro-explanation that stays at the macro-level does not tell us how the actions of the system’s components are organized.

Summing up now, contrary to what Abell, Felin and Foss (2007) argue, macro-explanations of macro-phenomena need not be incomplete in the sense that they miss out on chunks of parts in the causal chain leading to the macro-phenomena to be explained. No matter how fine-grained we want to partition the causal chain, macro-explanations can account for all of them. An important proviso here is, however, that levels are understood here as mechanisms and their constituent parts (and, if a mechanism is multi-level, the mechanism’s constituent parts can be understood as mechanisms in their own right with their own constituent parts). It remains to be seen whether the argument given also holds if mechanisms and levels are understood differently. Another qualification to be made is that a macro-explanation of some macro-phenomenon (in terms of mechanisms described at the macro-level) do not seem to be a mechanistic explanation because it does not show how the mechanism bringing about the macro-phenomenon works internally.


5. Routines as multilevel mechanisms

Thus far, the discussion of macro- en micro-explanation and of the various possible relations between levels has been general. What was discussed in general terms was how adjacent levels are related to each other, especially if the relation between levels is one of mechanisms and their components parts. The specific way in which routines and organizational capabilities figure in macro-explanations (both as explananda and as explanantia) did not receive much attention yet. In this section I argue that routines are multilevel mechanisms and that individual firm members, with their capacities, properties, actions and interactions, can be seen are component parts of routines. I furthermore argue that explanations of firm behavior and of firm performance in terms of routines are mechanistic explanations.

Nelson and Winter’s (1982) discussion of routines still stands as one of the most thorough analyses of the notion of routine. Nelson and Winter develop their notion of a routine in analogy both with the skills of individuals (“routines as skills”) and the genes of organisms (“routines as genes”). Routines are like skills, Nelson and Winter argue, in that routines embody organizational (tacit) knowledge and organizational (working) memory, just as skills embody individual tacit knowledge and individual working memory. They also argue that routines are like skills in that options are typically selected automatically, that is, without awareness that a choice is being made (Nelson and Winter 1982, 73). Nelson and Winter contrast their view on firm behaviour with that in “orthodox” (neoclassical) economics, in which it is assumed that firm behaviour is the outcome of flexible deliberate choice. They take routines to be like genes in that they both designate features (of firms and organisms, respectively) that are persistent (or stable) over time. Routines are like genes also in the sense that they both are key determinants of behaviour (again, of firms and organisms, respectively). As Nelson and Winter argue, knowledge of a firm’s routines is the heart of understanding the firm’s behaviour (ibid., 128). In their behaviour firms are taken to be programmed by their routines in much the same way as the behaviour of individual organisms is programmed by their genes. In their formal models, routines are represented as fixed decision-rules.

Whether or not routines are analogous to genes, replicators and/or to individual skills is contentious. What is not contentious, however, is that individuals, their skills and their genes are component parts of routines (Vromen 2006). No one working on routines (and on organizational capabilities) denies that routines are to be situated at the firm level (rather than at the individual level) and that several individuals in the firm are involved in the running of a routine. Consider Nelson and Winter’s discussion of an organization in routine operation:

The overall picture of an organization in routine operation can now be drawn. A flow of messages comes into the organization from the external environment and from clocks and calendars. The organization members receiving these messages interpret them as calling for the performance of routines from their repertoires. These repertoires include ones that would be thought of as directly productive – such as unloading the truck that has arrived at the loading dock – and others of a clerical or information-processing nature – such as routing a customer’s inquiry or order to the appropriate point in the organization. Either as an incidental consequence of other sorts of action or as deliberate acts of communication, the performance of routines by each organization member generates a stream of messages to others. These messages in turn are interpreted as calling for particular performances by their recipients, which generate other performances, messages, interpretations, and so on. At any given time, organization members are responding to messages originating from other members as well as from the environment; the above description of the process as starting with information input from external sources or timekeeping devices is merely an expositional convenience. There is, indeed, an internal equilibrium “circular flow” of information in an organization, but it is a flow that is continuously primed by external message sources and timekeeping devices.
(Nelson and Winter 1982, 103)
 

Note that this depiction of a firm in routine operation fits the general description of mechanism given above very well. The messages coming into the organization are the set-up conditions activating a cascade of interlocking routines inside the firm that in the end result in firm behavior and firm performance (as the system’s finish conditions). What this implies is not only that viewing firm behavior as the outcome of the functioning of the firm’s routines implies seeing firms as nested systems. A firm is seen here as a nested system in the sense that it consists of interlocked subsystems (routines) which in turn consist of sub-subsystems (the firm’s units) which in turn consist of sub-sub-subsystems (individual organization members) and so on. Nelson and Winter’s depiction of a firm in routine operation also implies that an explanation of the firm’s behavior in terms of its routines is a mechanistic macro-explanation. Explaining firm behavior in terms of the firm’s routines is a macro-explanation in that routines are understood to be at the firm level. But it is a mechanistic explanation in that the routines involved in the firm’s routine operation are seen as component parts of the firm’s routine operation.

As subsystems of a firm, routines are themselves multi-level mechanisms. As argued above, underneath several disagreements about how precisely to understand routines there is a basic agreement that individual organization members performing certain tasks play a crucial part in the running of routines. It is clear that organization members need to have certain skills if they are to perform their tasks in a routine. One could even go on by arguing that organization members need to have certain genes for them to have certain skills. Thus whether or not routines are like skills and genes in relevant respects, there does not seem to be no way of denying that individuals, their actions and interactions, but also their skills and genes, are constituent parts of routines.
























Craver’s Figure seems to give a more accurate depiction of how a firm’s routines produce the firm’s behavior and output than Coleman’s diagram. What Craver’s Figure nicely illustrates is that there is nothing in between the operation of a firm’s routines and the firm’s behaviour. Under ‘normal’ conditions, firm behaviour simply is the operation of its routines. If a firm is in routine operation, the operation of its routines directly (and not indirectly, as Abell, Felin and Foss 2007 argue) issues in the firm’s behaviour. Routine behaviour then captures all there is to what is happening within the firm. Unlike Weber’s protestant religious doctrines and values, which are not constituting parts of the economic organization of society (and that hence are ‘external’, though causally related, to the economic organization of society), routines are constituting parts of firm behaviour (if firms are in routine operation). Routines are internal to firms and the predictable part of their behaviour. If a firm is in routine operation, then routines are how firms behave internally.​[3]​ What is at issue then is at what level firm behavior should be described.

Using Carver’s in connection with routines and firm behavior is not a mere exercise in “boxology”. There is little doubt that the boxes and arrows in the Figure refer to real rather than fictional entities, activities and relations. The Figure aptly depicts what routines are and how they work (internally). The Figure also suggests that a micro-explanation of firm behavior at the bottom level is more fine-grained than a macro-explanation at the intermediate level. This can be generalized: micro-explanations of a multi-level mechanism are more fine-grained than macro-explanations not just in that they analyze the functioning of the mechanism (“vertically”) at the level of smaller parts, but also in that they track the functioning of the mechanism (“horizontally”) in smaller time intervals.

A Figure cannot substitute for a theory, however. The Figure does not tell how precisely how different units, individuals and their actions and interactions within some firm combine into routines. What the Figure does not tell in particular is when and why routines are stable over time. This, I submit, is one of the reasons why we need constitutive-mechanistic explanations of routines.

It has been noted by several writers on mechanisms and on mechanistic explanation that for an explanation of some phenomenon in terms of some mechanism bringing about the phenomenon to make sense the mechanism in question must have some endurance in time. If the mechanism has a transient and fleeting existence only, it seems to make more sense to explain the phenomenon in another way. Glennan (2002) argues that stability of configuration or arrangement is a necessary requirement for something to act as a reliable mechanism. Wimsatt’s 1994/2007 notion of dynamic autonomy captures the same idea: higher-level processes can be referred to as mechanisms if they are dynamically autonomous, that is if they are relatively insensitive to changes in the microphysical processes on which they supervene.

If proponents of macro-explanations of firm behavior in terms of the firm’s routines are right, routines display this kind of stability and dynamic autonomy. Not only are routines argued to be stable over time. Routines tend to be tenacious and even inert over time. This was the gist of Nelson and Winter’s “routines as genes” analogy. It is argued moreover that routines tend to survive personnel turnover (Nelson and Winter 1982, Levitt and March 1988, Kogut and Zander 1992; seem to be accepted in Abel et al. 2007, 16). The same old routines tend to remain in place also if old employees are replaced by new ones.

Abell et al. seem to have an ambivalent stance on this. Sometimes they seem to argue the best way to get rid of old routines is to hire new personnel. At other times they acknowledge that routines can be remarkably robust (indeed to the point that routines can survive personnel turnover). I think that one good reason to require micro-analyses is exactly this: to find out when and why routines tend to be resilient. Evolutionary game theoretic analyses might help us understand better when interaction patterns within firm are resilient against ‘mutations’ in personnel, for example. This could be one way to follow-up on Nelson and Winter’s suggestion that routines can be seen as truces within firms.

In situations in which routines tend to be stable to the degree that they even tend to survive personnel turnover, it makes sense to explain firm behavior in terms of the firm’s routines. That the relative stability of the units at various levels is a relevant issue in deciding whether macro- or micro-explanations are to be preferred was already argued by Coleman. Coleman argues that “an explanation based on the internal analysis of system behavior in terms of actions and considerations of lower-level units is likely to be more stable and general than an explanation which remains at the system level. Since the system’s behavior is in fact a resultant of the actions of its component parts, knowledge of how the actions of these parts combine to produce systematic behavior can be expected to give greater predictability than will explanation based on statistical relations of surface characteristics of the system” (Coleman 1990, 3). This argument in favor of micro-explanation is subscribed to without any reservation by Abell et al. If Nelson and Winter are right, however, this argument can be turned upside down: it can be turned in favor of macro-explanation of firm behavior in terms of the firm’s routines.






Abell, Felin and Foss are right that there is a need for more micro-analyses of routines and organizational capabilities in the field of strategic management. But their diagnosis of what is wrong with extant macro-explanations in strategic management (and, indeed, with all macro-explanations that remain at the macro-level) on which they base their plea for micro-foundations is wrong. Contrary to what Abell et al. argue, macro-explanations need not be incomplete in the sense that they miss out on links in the complete causal chain that connect macro-phenomena with each other. Abell et al’s use of Coleman’s diagram to substantiate their claim that macro-explanations are necessarily incomplete is misguided. Once we appreciate that the inter-level relation between routines at the macro-level and the individual actions and interactions as their component parts at the micro-level is constitutive and not causal, we can see that Coleman’s diagram needs to be squared. And once we have done this, we can also see that not the “Arrow 4 – explanations” (which directly connect macro-phenomena with each other) but “Arrow 1 – explanations” (supposedly indicating downward causation) and “Arrow 3 – explanation” (supposedly indicating upward causation) are (at best) convenient shorthands. “Arrow 4 – explanations” can be causally complete. True, routines are (partly) made up by individual actions and interactions and  micro-explanations of routine firm behavior are more fine-grained than macro-explanations of firm behavior in terms of the firm’s routines. But the fact that macro-explanations are more coarse-grained does not make them causally incomplete.

More micro-analyses are needed for another reason: micro-analyses can help us in finding out when and why routines actually have the macro-properties that are attributed to them in the literature. One of these properties is that routines tend to be stable and even resilient against personnel turnover. This attribution of stability and resilience of routines is contested. Whether routines are stable and resilient clearly is a contingent, empirical matter. To the extent that routines actually are stable and resilient, micro-analyses could help us understand better why and in what conditions routines tend to be stable and resilient. In the conditions specified, macro-explanations of firm behavior and firm performance in terms of the firm’s routines might be preferable to micro-explanations in terms of the individual actions and interactions underlying the routines on the ground that routines exhibit greater stability than the individuals and their properties making them up. This resolves the paradox that a preference for coarse-grained macro-explanation might be partly based on more and better micro-analyses.
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^1	  Although Felin and Foss are not the only protagonists, I take them to be the main driving forces behind the microfoundations project. Felin and Foss explicitly link their project with reduction in science (Felin and Foss 2006, 25). 
^2	  As Craver makes clear, in mechanistic explanation the relation between a mechanism and its component parts is not a supervenience or realization relation. Whereas the relation between a mechanism and its component parts is symmetrical, the relation between a supervening property and its supervenient basis is asymmetrical (Craver 2007, 153, footnote 33). Furthermore, the relation between a mechanism and its component parts is quite unlike the relation between mental states and brain states (where mental states are taken to be realized in brain states). Brain states are mot component parts of mental states.
^3	  Following up on Nelson and Winter’s characterization of routines as memory, truce, and target, Hutchins argues that “An organization has many parts, and the operation of the whole emerges from the interactions of those parts. Each part may simultaneously provide constraints on the behavior of other parts and be constrained by the behavior of other parts. […] organizations are the kind of systems that consist of many interlocking, interacting, and mutually dependent parts” (Hutchins 1995, 346-347).
